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GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT: NON-PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND OF VEHICLES FOR THEIR DELIVERY IN ALL ITS ASPECTS

Report of the Secretary-General

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. In its resolution 48/75 C of 16 December 1993, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to prepare a report containing a brief description of the question of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of vehicles for their delivery. The report is to be considered by a representative intergovernmental group of experts in order to make suggestions regarding further study of the question by the international community in various multilateral disarmament forums.

2. The present report sets out to provide a description of treaties and other agreements which have direct non-proliferation objectives, as well as those which have an indirect bearing on the non-proliferation issues. Only short summaries of the main obligations in the treaties and other agreements referred to are included in the present report. Reference should be made to the official texts for the full coverage of obligations, provisions and procedures.

II. AGREEMENTS CONCERNING NUCLEAR WEAPONS

A. Multilateral

3. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The Treaty was opened for signature in 1968 and entered into force in 1970. At present it has 164 States parties. At the 1995 Conference of the Parties to the Treaty (25 years after entry into force) a decision must be taken on whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely or be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. The treaty requires States parties to comply with the following principal obligations:

(a) Nuclear-weapon States. Not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over them; nor to assist, encourage or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or gain control over them;

(b) Non-nuclear-weapon States:

(i) Not to receive nuclear weapons, or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over them; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other explosive devices, nor to seek or receive any assistance in their manufacture;

(ii) To conclude agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on safeguards to be applied to all nuclear source or special fissionable materials used in all peaceful activities within the territory of each non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere;

(c) All States parties:

(i) To facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy;

(ii) To pursue negotiations on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race, nuclear disarmament and a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

4. Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water (Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT)). The Treaty was opened for signature in August 1963 and entered into force in October of the same year. At present it has 122 States parties. Under the provisions of the Treaty, States Parties are committed to prohibit, to prevent and not to carry out nuclear weapons test explosions, or any other nuclear explosion, in the atmosphere, in outer space or under water. In addition, States Parties are not permitted to carry out such activities in any other environment if this causes radioactive debris to be present outside of their territorial boundaries. States Parties are also required to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in, such prohibited activities by others anywhere. In January 1991 an Amendment Conference was held under the provisions of the Treaty with the aim of converting the Treaty into a comprehensive instrument. The Conference concluded that further work needed to be undertaken. There was broad agreement that the President of the Conference should conduct consultations with a view to achieving progress on certain aspects of a comprehensive test-ban treaty and to resuming the work of the Conference at an appropriate time. At the special meeting convened in August 1993, there was broad agreement among States parties that the work on a comprehensive test ban in the different forums, and especially the Amendment Conference and the Conference on Disarmament, should be mutually supportive and mutually complementary, and that the President of the Conference should continue his consultations.

5. Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. The Convention was opened for signature in 1980 and entered into force in 1987. Under this Convention, States parties are obliged to ensure that nuclear material used for peaceful purposes (plutonium, uranium (235 and 233) and irradiated fuel) is protected according to agreed standards during international transport across their territory, or on ships and aircraft under their jurisdiction. In certain circumstances, the Convention applies to such material while in domestic use, storage and transport. States parties are committed to share information on missing nuclear material to facilitate recovery and to introduce necessary domestic legislation to support the implementation of the Convention.

B. Regional

6. Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco). This Treaty was opened for signature in February 1967 and entered into force for each Government individually. To date there are 34 States parties. The Treaty obligations include a ban on the

possession, testing, use, manufacture, production or acquisition of nuclear weapons by States parties for themselves or any third party. States parties are also required to refrain from encouraging or authorizing, or in any way participating in such activities anywhere. The zone of application of the Treaty is the whole of the Latin American and Caribbean region, including areas of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans (articles 3 and 4 of the Treaty). There are two additional protocols as follows:

(a) Protocol I. Protocol I provides for the application of the obligations under the Treaty to territories which are under the jurisdiction or control of States from outside the region, but which lie within the zone of application. The States concerned are France, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America. All these States have acceded to the Protocol;

(b) Protocol II. Under the terms of Protocol II the five nuclear-weapon States agree to recognize the nuclear-weapon-free zone established under the Treaty. They also undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the States parties. All five nuclear-weapon States have acceded to the Protocol.

7. South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga). The Treaty was opened for signature in 1985 and entered into force in 1986. At present there are 11 States parties. Within the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone, as defined in annex 1 to the Treaty, States parties are obliged not to manufacture or otherwise acquire, possess or have control of any nuclear explosive device anywhere inside or outside the zone of application. They are also not permitted to assist or encourage others to engage in such activities. Further, States parties may not supply source or special fissionable materials unless the importer makes safeguards agreements with IAEA. Stationing or testing of nuclear explosive devices is not permitted on the territory of States parties. The Treaty also contains provisions to prevent dumping on the territories of States parties and the ocean areas within the zone of application. There are three protocols to the Treaty as follows:

(a) Protocol I. Under the terms of Protocol I, which is open for signature by France, the United Kingdom and the United States, those States would undertake to apply, in respect of territories for which they are internationally responsible situated within the zone of application, the prohibitions of the Treaty in so far as they relate to the manufacture, stationing or testing of any nuclear explosive devices within those territories. These countries have not acceded to the Protocol;

(b) Protocol II. Protocol II calls for an assurance from the five nuclear-weapon States not to use or threaten to use any nuclear explosive device against States parties. China and the Russian Federation have acceded to the Protocol;

(c) Protocol III. Under the terms of Protocol III the five nuclear-weapons States undertake not to test any nuclear explosive device anywhere within the zone of application. China and the Russian Federation have acceded to the Protocol.

C. Bilateral

8. Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START I) and Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II). Both START I (signed on 31 July 1991) and START II (signed on 3 January 1993) cover the reduction and setting of limits on nuclear warheads and their delivery vehicles. The scope of the Treaties includes intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and their launchers, submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and their launchers, nuclear armed heavy bombers, ICBM warheads, SLBM warheads and heavy bomber armaments. Once both treaties have been fully implemented, the number of warheads held by the United States and the Russian Federation shall not exceed 3,500 each. 1/ The provisions require the dismantlement of the warheads and delivery vehicles being reduced or eliminated. 2/ To promote the objective and implementation of the provisions, the parties established the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission in accordance with article XV of the Treaty and the relevant Protocol. In the Lisbon Protocol to the START I Treaty, signed on 23 May 1992, the United States, the Russian Federation, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, recognized the altered political situation resulting from the replacement of the former Soviet Union with a number of independent States and the need for the nuclear weapons of the former Soviet Union to be maintained under the safe, secure and reliable control of a single unified authority. Consequently, Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation and Ukraine, as successor States of the former Soviet Union in connection with the START I Treaty, agreed to assume the obligations of the former Soviet Union under the Treaty. In addition, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine committed themselves to adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as non-nuclear-weapons States parties, in the shortest possible time. By the end of 1993, all the States concerned had ratified START I and the Lisbon Protocol. Belarus and Kazakhstan have also adhered to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. To date, Ukraine has not yet adhered to that accord. In early 1994, a trilateral agreement (A/49/66-S/1994/91, annex) was signed in Moscow between the Russian Federation, Ukraine and the United States which addressed the outstanding issues with a view to permitting the implementation of START I and facilitating the early ratification of START II.

9. Agreement between the United States of America and the Russian Federation concerning the Safe and Secure Transportation, Storage and Destruction of Weapons and the Prevention of Weapons Proliferation. At their Washington summit meeting, on 16 and 17 June 1992, President Bush and President Yeltsin signed the above-mentioned Agreement. The United States agreed to assist the Russian Federation in destroying its nuclear, chemical and other weapons; provide safe and secure transportation and storage of such weapons in connection with their destruction; and establish additional verifiable measures against the proliferation of such weapons. 3/ The agreement took effect upon signature. Measures of United States assistance in building a storage site for plutonium and highly enriched uranium, improving the security features of Russian warhead-transport railcars, using or disposing of fissile materials from warheads and setting up a system for accounting for fissile materials were pursued after the summit. In 1993, the United States and the Russian Federation signed a contract by which the United States would buy the low-grade uranium resulting from the

mixing of material uranium with the highly enriched uranium in Russian plants. By virtue of the fact that this agreement entitled the conversion of weapons-grade uranium into uranium that could be used only for peaceful purposes, the parties considered it a major step forward in fulfilling their mutual non-proliferation objectives.

10. Argentine-Brazilian Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC). ABACC, inaugurated in 1992, was set up under the terms of the Guadalajara Agreement between Argentina and Brazil of 18 July 1991. Under the Agreement, the two countries agreed to use nuclear materials for peaceful purposes only. They undertook to prohibit and prevent, and not to participate in any way in, the testing, manufacture or acquisition of nuclear weapons. They also accepted a commitment to prohibit the receipt, installation, deployment or any other kind of positioning of nuclear weapons on any territory under their jurisdiction or control. The objective of ABACC is to administer and implement the common system of accounting and control of nuclear materials to verify that the nuclear material in all nuclear activities is not diverted for prohibited purposes. A Quadripartite Agreement between Argentina, Brazil, ABACC and IAEA was signed by the parties on 13 December 1991 and entered into force on 4 March 1994. The Agreement lays down a comprehensive system of safeguards.

11. Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Under the terms of this Declaration, signed at Seoul on 17 February 1992, 4/ the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea undertook not to test, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons. They also made a commitment to use nuclear energy solely for peaceful purposes and not to operate facilities for nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment. The Declaration entered into force on the date of its signature, after which mutual inspections of facilities were due to take place and a Joint Nuclear Control Committee was to be established. However, owing to the tensions between the two countries over the past 18 months, those provisions have not yet been put into effect.

D. International organizations

12. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). IAEA was established in 1956 with the objective of seeking "to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity" 5/ and "to encourage and assist ... peaceful uses throughout the world". 6/ Its current membership comprises 117 States. The Agency is required to ensure, as far as it is able, that the assistance it provides is not used to further any military purpose. This general responsibility is in addition to those placed upon the Agency by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (see para. 3 (b) above) and other international treaties. IAEA also works in conjunction with other international agencies, including the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear-Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL) and the Argentine-Brazilian Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC).

13. European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM). The 12 member States of the European Union are members of EURATOM, which was established in 1958. On a

regional scale, EURATOM has objectives similar to those of the IAEA in the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, as well as a system of safeguards to help prevent diversion of nuclear materials to military purposes. For the latter objective EURATOM has developed safeguards procedures in close cooperation with IAEA.

E. International arrangements

14. Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). The Nuclear Suppliers Group, founded in 1976, comprises 28 supplier States of nuclear-related equipment, material and technology. The objective of the Group is to ensure that their nuclear exports are made under proper safeguards and physical protection to prevent diversion of the material and technology to military uses. The members commit themselves, by imposing controls through national laws and regulations, to using a common list 7/ of equipment and technology. In particular, members are required to exercise restraint in supplying enrichment and reprocessing plant assistance to countries of proliferation concern and to exercise restraint in general on exports to regions where there is instability or conflict.

F. Negotiations/consultations in progress

15. Draft treaty on the denuclearization of Africa. Under the terms of General Assembly resolution 47/76 of 15 December 1992, the Secretary-General convened a Group of Experts to draw up a draft treaty or convention on the denuclearization of Africa. The Group has produced a draft text (which contains obligations similar to those in the treaties of Rarotonga and Tlatelolco) of a nuclear-weapon free-zone treaty (A/48/371, annex, appendix). The text needs to be finalized, and to that end the Assembly, in its resolution 48/86 of 16 December 1993, requested the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Organization of African Unity, to take appropriate action to enable the Group of Experts to finalize the drafting of the treaty, and to submit the text to the Assembly at its forty-ninth session. 8/

16. Comprehensive test-ban treaty. On 10 August 1993, the Conference on Disarmament decided to give its Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban a mandate to negotiate a comprehensive test-ban treaty. On 16 December 1993, the General Assembly adopted, without a vote, resolution 48/70, in which it commended the Conference and urged it to proceed intensively. At the beginning of its 1994 session, the Conference on Disarmament adopted the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee to negotiate intensively a universal and multilaterally and effectively verifiable comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, which would contribute effectively to the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects, to the process of nuclear disarmament and therefore to the enhancement of international peace and security. The Ad Hoc Committee is currently engaged in these negotiations, as a matter or priority, and has established working groups on verification and legal and institutional issues.

17. Prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear-weapon or other nuclear explosive devices. The goal of a cut-off of fissile material for weapons purposes has been pursued in the United Nations for many years. In

1993, for the first time, the General Assembly was able to adopt a unanimous resolution (resolution 48/75 L) on the subject. In it, the Assembly recommended the negotiation in the most appropriate international forum of a non-discriminatory, multilateral and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Consultations on the subject are being held, at present, in the Conference on Disarmament at Geneva, with the aim of determining an appropriate mandate for the establishment of an ad hoc committee on the subject-matter.

III. AGREEMENTS CONCERNING CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

A. Multilateral

18. Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous, or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (Geneva Protocol of 1925). Parties to the Geneva Protocol are obliged not to use chemical or biological weapons in war. Many States parties, when ratifying the Protocol, entered a reservation to the effect that they would not be bound by the Protocol in relation to a State which used such weapons against them. However, a number of States have withdrawn their reservations in light of their signature of the Chemical Weapons Convention (see para. 20 below). The Geneva Protocol does not ban development, production or stockpiling of chemical or biological weapons. At present there are 130 States parties.

19. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (Biological Weapons Convention). The Convention was opened for signature in 1972 and entered into force in 1975. At present it has 130 States parties. States parties to the Convention undertake not to develop, produce, stockpile, or in any way acquire or retain biological agents or toxins of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes. The parties are also banned from possessing weapons, equipment or delivery means designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in an armed conflict. Parties are not permitted to assist, induce or encourage others to engage in any of these activities. On the other hand, parties are to facilitate material and information exchange for peaceful purposes. There are no verification provisions, but any State party may lodge a complaint with the Security Council, which can investigate the matter. A confidence-building measure (CBM) regime was introduced after the 1986 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty; the regime was further developed at the 1991 Review Conference. The confidence-building measures involve annual declarations about facilities that work on dangerous pathogens and toxins, defence programmes, publications and the encouragement of contacts between scientists of the States parties. By the end of 1993, 40 States parties had submitted reports to the United Nations called for under the regime. Concerns about the lack of verification provisions led to a decision at the 1991 Review Conference to set up a Group of governmental experts to identify and examine potential verification measures from a scientific and technical standpoint (VEREX). The Group completed its work in September 1993, and a report on 21 potential measures was submitted to the States parties. A majority of States parties have requested a special conference to consider the report; the

conference will take place in September 1994. The Preparatory Committee established to prepare the conference met in April 1994.

20. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (Chemical Weapons Convention). The Chemical Weapons Convention, which was opened for signature on 13 January 1993, will enter into force 180 days after the deposit of the 65th instrument of ratification, but in any event no earlier than 13 January 1995 (two years after it was opened for signature). To date, 157 States have signed the Convention and 7 have ratified it. The principal obligations of the Convention are not to use, develop, produce, or otherwise acquire, stockpile or transfer chemical weapons. States parties must not engage in military preparations or use chemical weapons and must not assist or encourage others to engage in these prohibited activities. In addition, States parties are required to destroy any chemical weapons they possess as well as any chemical weapons production facilities that have produced these weapons at any time since 1 January 1946. 9/ An integral part of the verification system established under the Convention will be the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, which will provide the technical inspection organization for the system of monitoring compliance. The Convention has a cooperative element in the provisions for assistance in the event or threat of chemical attack (article X) and for economic and technical cooperation (article XI).

B. Regional

21. Joint Declaration on the Complete Prohibition of Chemical and Biological Weapons (Mendoza Agreement). 10/ In September 1991, Argentina, Brazil and Chile signed a Joint Declaration committing themselves to obligations not to develop, produce, acquire in any way, stockpile or retain, transfer or use chemical or biological weapons. The countries concerned undertook to set up inspection arrangements pending the entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Bolivia, Paraguay and Uruguay later also acceded to the Agreement.

C. Bilateral

22. Memorandum of Understanding between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on the Destruction of Chemical Weapons. In their joint statement at the Moscow summit (12-15 January 1994), President Clinton and President Yeltsin, inter alia, addressed several bilateral issues concerning chemical weapons. They announced the conclusion of the implementing documents for the 1989 Memorandum of Understanding between the United States and the former Soviet Union, signed at Jackson Hole, Wyoming, and agreed to speed up the bringing into force of their bilateral agreement of 1990 on the destruction of chemical weapons. The 1989 Memorandum of Understanding has the purpose of accelerating the process of the destruction of stockpiles of chemical weapons ahead of the entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention. The agreement provides for technical assistance and for on-site visits to verify the destruction process. The Chemical Weapons Convention provides for account to be

taken of bilateral agreements to avoid unnecessary duplication of effort wi... the inspection system of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

D. International arrangements

23. Australia Group. This Group, which first met in 1985, has been established to help prevent the spread of chemical weapons, and later biological weapons, through controls on chemical precursors, biological organisms and toxins and equipment which might have uses for chemical, biological and toxin weapons. The regime operates in accord with a common list of chemicals, organisms and equipment against which member States exercise controls through national legislation and regulations. The membership comprises some 25 States and, in addition, there are at least a dozen cooperating States that follow the guidelines but do not participate in meetings of the Group.

IV. AGREEMENTS CONCERNING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION IN GENERAL

A. Multilateral

24. Treaty on Principles Governing Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty). The Treaty was opened for signature in January 1967 and entered into force in October of the same year. At present it has 93 States parties. The Treaty contains provisions forbidding the placing in orbit around the earth of any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other weapon of mass destruction. The stationing or installation of such weapons on celestial bodies or in outer space is banned. The establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications, the testing of any type of weapon and the conduct of military manoeuvres on celestial bodies is also forbidden.

25. Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof (Sea-Bed Treaty). The Treaty was opened for signature in 1971 and entered into force in 1972. At present it has 89 States parties. The Treaty forbids the emplacement on the seabed, ocean floor or its subsoil, beyond a (12 nautical mile) territorial zone, of nuclear weapons or any other type of weapon of mass destruction. It also bans the setting up of structures, launching installations, or any other facilities specifically designed for storing, testing or using such weapons.

26. Antarctic Treaty. The Treaty was signed in 1959 and entered into force in 1961. At present there are 42 States parties. The Treaty forbids any measures of a military nature, including the testing of nuclear or any other type of weapons, in the zone of application. Also forbidden in the region is the dumping of radioactive waste. All installations in the region are to be open to inspection by observers designated by the States parties. Well over 100 inspections have taken place since the Treaty entered into force in 1961, most of them after 1980.

B. Regional

27. Cartagena Declaration on Renunciation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. 11/ In 1991, a Declaration on renunciation of weapons of mass destruction was signed at Cartagena, Colombia, by the five Heads of State of the countries of the Andean Group: Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela. The overall purpose of the Declaration is the prevention of the introduction of any weapon of mass destruction into the region and to enhance security among the States of the region. Although at present the commitment is limited to the five States, the intention is that it should be extended to all of Latin America and the Caribbean.

C. International arrangements

28. The five permanent members of the Security Council. In the course of their efforts to curb proliferation of weapons to the Middle East region, the five permanent members of the Security Council agreed on guidelines for the transfer of conventional weapons. 12/ Subsequently they adopted interim guidelines on the transfer of technology and equipment related to weapons of mass destruction. 13/ Both these sets of guidelines are intended to have global application.

29. International Science and Technology Centres. The International Science and Technology Centres were set up in 1992 by the European Union, Japan, the Russian Federation and the United States of America, with the aim of employing scientists and engineers who had been working on weapons programmes in the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States, in peaceful scientific and technological activities. The objective of the countries involved, through the projects of the Centres, is to contribute to the efforts to help prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

V. AGREEMENTS CONCERNING DELIVERY VEHICLES

A. Bilateral

30. Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty). The INF Treaty, which is of unlimited duration, bans the possession by the two parties of all ground-launched missiles with a range of between 500 and 1,000 (shorter range) and 1,000 and 5,500 kilometres (intermediate range). In accordance with article IV of the Treaty, all existing missiles, launchers and support structures were to be eliminated and future production and flight testing banned. The missiles were eliminated by both sides within three years after the entry into force of the Treaty (1 June 1988), as established by the Treaty. The implementation of the Treaty is overseen by a Special Verification Commission, in which the two parties (and the other countries concerned) participate. Each party has the right to conduct inspections for 13 years after the entry into force of the Treaty.

B. International arrangements

31. Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Set up by a group of supplier States in 1987, the objective of the Missile Technology Control Regime is to "limit the risks of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction ... by controlling transfers that could make a contribution to delivery systems (other than manned aircraft)". 14/ The MTCR regime divides the technology to be controlled into two categories as follows:

(a) Category I. This category includes complete rocket systems and unmanned air vehicles (including cruise missiles) capable of delivering at least a 500-kilogram payload to a range of at least 300 kilometres. It also covers complete sub-systems and rocket stages designed for systems which meet these range and payload criteria. Systems in this category are capable of carrying all three types of weapons of mass destruction;

(b) Category II. This category includes complete systems and sub-systems for missiles and unmanned air vehicles with a range capability greater than 300 kilometres regardless of payload capacity, as well as items such as components and propellants for both categories. The aim is to include missiles capable of carrying biological or chemical weapons.

In addition to the systems, sub-systems and components, members of the Missile Technology Control Regime are committed to placing controls on design and production technology. In this context, members have agreed to deny the transfer of production facilities for category I items. The controls are exercised through the members' national legislation and regulations, with the exporters making judgements case-by-case based on agreed guidelines. 15/

VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS

32. The treaties, agreements and organizations outlined in this report illustrate the gamut of possibilities to combat proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of their delivery vehicles. They range from treaties through informal cooperative confidence-building measures to supplier regimes. They are designed to provide a framework to regulate proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Whatever the approach to the question of non-proliferation in all its aspects, it has been recognized that "the proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction", as the Security Council affirmed in the closing statement of its summit meeting of 31 January 1992, "constitutes a threat to international peace and security".

Notes

1/ The Treaties cover those warheads attributed only to the delivery vehicles within the scope of the Treaties.

2/ There are some exceptions. For example, under START II, multiple warhead ICBMs can be downloaded to single warhead missiles and ninety Russian SS 18 silos can be converted to take single warhead missiles.

3/ A number of other countries, including France, Germany and the United Kingdom, are providing assistance to the Russian Federation on the safe transport and secure storage of dismantled nuclear weapons.

4/ CD/1147.

5/ Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, art. II.

6/ Ibid., art. III.

7/ The common list is composed of a list of materials which should be under safeguards in accordance with article III, paragraph 2, of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (the so-called "trigger list"), as well as some other facilities and technologies (for example, those required for heavy water production).

8/ The well-known recent developments in South Africa in the area of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons have contributed very significantly to the goal of the denuclearization of Africa. In 1993, in a communication to the Chairman of the United Nations Disarmament Commission (A/CN.10/181), the Government of South Africa expressed its desire to contribute to the establishment of Africa as a zone free of nuclear weapons.

9/ There are certain exceptions set out in article V, paras. 12 and 13, which allow for temporary conversion for purposes of destruction of chemical weapons and, in exceptional cases, permanent conversion for non-military purposes.

10/ CD/1126.

11/ CD/1114.

12/ The guidelines on conventional weapons were published by the five permanent members of the Security Council following their meeting in London on 17 and 18 October 1991. The text of the communiqué of the meeting, with the agreed guidelines, is reproduced in Disarmament: A Periodic Review by the United Nations, vol. XV, No. 1, 1992.

13/ Text published in Disarmament: A Periodic Review by the United Nations, vol. XV, No. 4, 1992.

14/ Paragraph 1 of the Missile Technology Control Regime Guidelines as announced by the MTCR members in January 1993.

15/ The current membership comprises 25 States; in addition, a number of other States, while not members of the Group, have pledged that they will abide by the guidelines.